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SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE SOMALIA PKO CONTINGENCY PLANNING

REF: SECSTATE 73567

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Sanders told DPKO's Africa Division chief that proper planning and preparation for a UN peacekeeping operation are essential to support any progress in the Somali political process. Titov reported that DPKO has begun limited military planning and will present a "range of options" when the SYG briefs the UNSC on the situation in Somalia in mid to late June. Titov said "politically permissive conditions" and full deployment of AMISOM forces were prerequisite to further UN involvement in Somalia. END SUMMARY.

DPKO Planning Moving
Forward Slowly

¶2. (C) AMB Jackie Sanders delivered reftel demarche points to Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Africa Director Dimitri Titov on May 31. AMB Sanders opened the meeting by asking Titov for an update on DPKO contingency planning for Somalia, emphasizing that UNSCR 1744 and the April 30 PRST had instructed DPKO to begin planning for a UN mission to replace AMISOM. Titov responded that DPKO has begun work on a "range of options" to be presented to the Council when the SYG's office briefs the Council on the situation in Somalia in June. (NOTE: The briefing is tentatively set for June 14. END NOTE.) Titov said that his military planning team's preliminary estimate is that a PKO mission to Somalia with a "limited mandate" would require at least twenty thousand soldiers to provide security in the Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo triangle.

¶3. (C) Titov said that the forthcoming report would be based on "several assumptions" regarding the conditions under which a UN force would deploy:

- Political progress that created a permissive political environment for a peacekeeping deployment.
- A successful, inclusive National Reconciliation Congress.
- A sustainable ceasefire.
- Full deployment of AMISOM forces.

¶4. (C) AMB Sanders responded that the conditions for a UN deployment of a UN force were an issue for Council consideration and that the Council had already instructed the UN to begin military planning for a UN deployment to replace AMISOM. Titov rebutted that the situation in Mogadishu is "frankly mayhem" and the Council could not expect that a UN peacekeeping force would deploy into a hostile environment.

DPKO Looking at Ways to
Support AMISOM

15. (C) Titov said that the UN has begun looking at ways that the UN can support AMISOM's deployment. Titov said that a robust AMISOM deployment would help set the stage for further UN engagement. Titov said he plans to meet with AU representatives in the next few days to discuss the possibility of expanded UN support for AMISOM and the U.S. should be prepared for the "standard AU request for funding and equipment."

COMMENT

16. (C) Working-level DPKO and DPA contacts have told USUN officers that they are reluctant to deploy UN peacekeepers to an operational environment as hostile as Somalia. France, Belgium and Italy will likely couch their opposition to further UN engagement in Somalia by echoing DPKO's insistence on first establishing permissive political conditions. As a first step in counteracting these nay-sayers, we should consider putting forward a PRST that sets attainable political objectives for the upcoming Somali National Reconciliation Congress.

KHALILZAD